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ABSTRACT
One of the primary goals of the United States' national
energy policy is a reduced dependence on foreign oil imports.
New technologies for the production of synthetic fuels from
coal and shale rock are being proposed as a means of reducing
these imports. Private industry, however, claims the need
for various forms of government support during the commercial-
ization stage in order to offset the high risks and costs of
developing these technologies.
In this thesis we: (a) present collected data for the
investment and operating costs of selected synthetic fuels
technologies; (b) obtain quantitative measures of their profit-
ability and risk using a Monte Carlo simulation technique;
(c) present a method for the valuation of demonstration plants
for new technologies; (d) examine the major areas of risk and
uncertainty involved in synthetic fuels development; and,
(e) discuss briefly the role of the government in the commer-
cialization stage of the development of synthetic fuels.
The appendix contains, in addition to the detailed cost
estimates and results of the financial analysis, a summary
of the major environmental problems anticipated with synfuels
production, and a brief description of the technologies
analyzed in this thesis.
Thesis Supervisor: Stewart C. Myers (Professor of Finance)
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I. Introduction
Ever since the 1974 energy crisis, when world oil prices
increased dramatically, awareness of the United States'
dependence on imported liquid fuels has greatly increased:
this dependence is viewed as an economic, and hence a national
security, threat. Consequently, independence from foreign
supplies of oil, or more precisely, protection from the threat
of another oil embargo, has become a primary goal of U.S.
national energy policy, and policies aimed at increasing
domestic supplies of oil and natural gas are being pursued by
the Department of Energy.
The DOE is currently showing great interest in technologies
for the production of synthetic oil and gas, particularly oil
shale and coal liquefaction and gasification. The primary
reason for this interest is the enormous quantity of synthetic
fuel potentially recoverable from coal and shales. One source*
estimates the U.S. share of the world's recoverable shale
resources (approximately 800 billion barrels oil equivalent) to
be 30.8%, and of the world's recoverable coal resources (approx-
imately 1,100 billion bbl oil equivalent) to be 72.7%. The
same source estimates the total world recoverable crude oil
reserves to be 716 million barrels, and the U.S.'s share to be
only 35 billion barrels (although these latter figures seem
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* See Reference (1).
rather low).
The basic technology for producing oil and gas from coal
and oil shales has been known for many years. During World
War II, Germany built twelve coal liquefaction plants that
accounted for a large proportion of her consumption of liquid
fuels, and South Africa is at present using the German
technology (the "Fisher-Tropsch" method) to produce both
natural gas and liquids from coal.* Other technologies have
been under research and development for many years: some are
only just emerging from bench-scale experimentation, others
are at the demonstration plant stage.**
Given the existence of such vast reserves, and the relative
level of development of certain of these technologies, why has
private industry not exploited these technologies to develop
the coal and shale resources of the United States?
The oil companies involved in the research and development
of synthetic fuels claim the need for government support at
* See Reference (1).
** Although there are no clear boundaries between the different
stages from bench-scale experimentation to full commerciali-
zation, the demonstration stage falls roughly between
development and commercialization. Demonstration essentially
involves scaling-up the basic research and linking together
the various components of the process, although not neces-
sarily at full-scale. An important part of demonstration
is the measurement of various technical parameters and
obtaining cost estimates for the process. Commercialization
is necessarily at full-scale, and results in pinning down
the costs. It may also be interpreted as including the
diffusion of the process into the market place.
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the commercialization stage, often quoting high costs and a high
degree of risk and uncertainty. The major areas of risk and
uncertainty associated with such projects can be identified as
follows:
1. With any new and untried technology, there are
technological problems encountered in scaling up the process
to a commercial scale. These are "risks" in two ways: first,
any unforeseen and lengthy delays in construction and oper-
ation of the plant caused by technological problems can
greatly increase the cost of the plant; second, any design
changes or refinements that must be made can increase both
the construction and the operating costs.
2. There are uncertainties over the exact environmental
impacts of full-scale operation of such plants, and over the
future environmental regulations that will apply. If it
transpires that the commercial-size plants do not satisfy the
Federal or state environmental requirements, the pollution
control equipment required to comply with the regulations will
increase the costs. Even if the plant meets current require-
ments, pressure from environmental protection groups may cause
future regulations to become more stringent. Finally, a very
large number of permits must be obtained before construction
of plants can be completed, and inordinate delays in the time
required to obtain them can delay construction and increase
costs.
-7-
3. There is great uncertainty over the future world price
oil, and over government controls of the domestic price.
Producers may not be allowed to sell their porducts at the
world price, and if they are allowed to do so the path of
world oil prices becomes critical in determining the profit-
ability of the plant. On top of this there is the possibility
that the government may tax away "excess profits" from such
plants, leaving the company a distribution of returns that may
be truncated at the upper tail.
Although it is relatively easy to identify the major areas
of risk and uncertainty, it is not easy to quantify them. It
is clear, however, that the economics of synthetic fuels
production must be better understood before we can discuss
whether or not the government should be involved in their
development. More specifically, we need a quantitative
measure of the profitability and riskiness of such projects,
and this is the principal aim of this paper.
In the next section we present investment and operating
cost estimates for some favored synthetic fuel technologies,
and describe, in Section III, our financial analysis and
present the results. In light of our results, we conclude, in
Section IV, with a discussion of issues related to government
involvement in the commercialization of synthetic fuels.
Appendix A contains a brief overview of the technologies
analyzed in this paper. A brief discussion of our sources of
-8-
cost data and a detailed breakdown of the cost estimates will
be found in Appendix B. Detailed results of the financial
analysis are presented in Appendix C, and in Appendix D we
present an overview of the major environmental issues involved.
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II. Investment and Operating Costs For Selected Technologies
As stated in the Introduction, our principal aim in this
study is to gain a better understanding of the economics of
synthetic fuels production, so that we may have a sounder
basis for discussing the role of the government in developing
these technologies.
As a first step, we must obtain estimates of the construc-
tion and operating costs for a commercial-size plant for the
technologies under consideration. Unfortunately, this is,
for various reasons, the most difficult part of the study.
First, there are the endogenous uncertainties regarding the
technologies themselves. As no full-sized plants have yet
been built in the U.S., all the hard engineering data is
from small-scale testing, or at most, pilot plants. Further-
more, different components of the entire production process
are at different stages of development, some more technologi-
cally uncertain than others. Hence, technical problems can
be expected when scaling-up the process to full size, and this
can cause cost overruns for two reasons: (1) inordinate delays
during construction are costly, no matter what their origin;
and (2) any changes or refinements that may become necessary
will also increase costs.
The other reasons for uncertainty in present cost esti-
mates are essentially exogenous, and can cause cost overruns
for the same reasons as above; that is , they can cause delays
-10-
in construction or necessitate expensive alterations in design.
One such reason is the concern over the environmental impact
of synfuels production. The possibility of lengthy delays in
obtaining the necessary permits or due to action by environ-
mental protection groups has added to the preceived risk and
costs of these projects.
In addition to the above problems, the researcher in search
of cost estimates faces several others. First, the sources
generally do not give adequate information about the assumptions
or parameters used in arriving at their figures; second, the
most recent and complete cost estimates are proprietary property
of the companies involved, and hence unavailable.
The technolgoical uncertainties do, in principle, lend
themselves to quantitative treatment. The effect of cost
overruns on profitability and the variance of the profitability
can be calculated, and this is the subject of Section III. The
other, exogenous, problems are relatively more difficult to
quantify, and we have not attempted to do so in this paper.
(The main environmental issues, however, are summarized and
discussed qualitatively in Appendix D.)
In this report we examine four coal liquefaction tech-
nologies (SRC, Synthoil, H-Coal, and EDS) and a modified in-situ
oil shale technology. The four coal liquefaction technologies
were chosen for two reasons: (1) they are at or near the
pilot plant stage, and have received attention at the Department
-11-
of Energy; and, (2) reasonably complete cost data was available,
and the costs appear to be in the same range as those of other
liquefaction and gasification technologies. A modified in-situ
technology was chosen for oil shale as it is the variation
considered most likely to be commercialized in the near future.
A brief background to these technologies is given in Appendix
A, and our sources of cost data are briefly discussed in
Appendix B.
The investment and annual operating costs for the tech-
nologies are summarized in Table 1 (a more detailed breakdown
is given in Appendix B). The assumptions and parameters used in
arriving at these figures are summarized as follows;
1. 1976 dollars are used throughout.
2. The plants yield 50,000 bb/stream day (60,000 bbl/sd
EDS), and operate 330 days/year.
3. Because the processes yld different products of
differing value, the operating costs have been adjusted
to reflect this fact, and to put them on a comparable
basis. The calculations for this are described in
Appendix B.
4. The operating costs do not provide for the replacement
of worn-out equipment, and provision for this is in-
cluded in the cashflow analysis in Section III.
5. As a contingency for difficulties with the process in
the first year, the output in that year is taken as
only 50% of normal, as is the consumption of coal
(or shale) and utilities.
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6. Wyodak coal will be at $7.50/ton and Illinois and
Western Kentucky coal will be at $20/ton* throughout
the life of the plant.
7. In Table 1, the figures refer to startup of operations
in 1987, whereas the figures in Appendix B refer to
startup in 1976. The costs have been escalated (in
real terms) to account for increases in labor and
materials costs in the interim.
From the figures in Table 1 we can see that EDS has the
highest investment and operating costs of the coal liquefaction
technolgoies, and that modified in-situ oil shale appears less
expensive than the coal liquefaction technologies. Because we
have adjusted the operating costs to account for the differing
grades of liquid products from the technologies, H-Coal appears
to have the lowest operating costs. This is due to the fact
that the H-Coal process examined here includes some refining
of the products to produce more expensive fuels. This is also
reflected in the high investment costs of H-Coal as compared to
SRC and Synthoil.
Our cost estimates are not as recent or reliable as we
would have wished, and are subject to considerable uncertainty,
What is important, however, is that they are representative of
the order of magnitude of the costs, and therefore will provide
us with a range of values to work with in our financial analysis.
* From private communication with Professor Martin Zimmerman
at Sloan School of Management, M.I.T.
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TABLE 1: Cost summary for selected technologies (000)*
First year Annual Subtotal Total
operating operating for depre- invest-
costs costs ciation ment
SRC 138,617 203,706 791,102 854,390
SYNTHOIL 189,725 245,004 647,051 771,756
H-COAL 127,350 143,500 1,171,796 1,265,539
EDS 246,747 374,760 1,648,843 1,741,687
IN-SITU SHALE 135,792 192,163 674,560 748,760
* For assumptions involved in arriving at these figures, see
text. A breakdown of these figures is presented in Appendix
B. Note, however, that these costs have been escalated at
2% per year to a 1987 startup (but in 1976 $), whereas the
figures in the Appendix are for a 1976 startup.
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III. Financial Analysis
Having presented estimates of the investment and operating
costs for our selected technologies, we now describe how these
estimates are used to arrive at measures of profitability and
risk.
As a first step, we calculate the after-tax annual cash-
flows to the plant, and use their net present value (NPV) as
our measure of profitability. Our basic equation for calcu-
lating the cashflow is:
after-tax annual cashflow =
[(annual quantity of oil produced x world price per
barrel) - annual operating costs] x (1 - tax rate) +
(annual depreciation x tax rate).
The cashflow for each year is calculated using the appropriate
values for the parameters and in accordance with the assumptions
of the model (described below).
We have already mentioned the uncertainty over the future
world price of oil. In order to illustrate the impact of the
future prices on profitability, or more specifically, the future
path of oil prices, we have chosen five scenarios for the world
price of oil, all starting at $14/bbl in 1977. These scenarios
range from highly optimistic to pessimistic price projections
(from the point of view of the oil companies), and are illu-
strated in Figure 1. It must be emphasized that we are not
-15-
Figure . Scenarios for the world price of oil
1982 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
-16-
S/BBL
40
35
30
25
20
attempting to forecast future oil prices, but have chosen the
scenarios to illustrate a range of reasonable prices.
In addition to those listed in Section II, the assumptions
and parameters on which our model is based are summarized as
follows:
1. The plant has an operating life of 20 years.
Initial investment in plant and equipment is made in
one lump sum at the beginning of year one, and the
cashflows are received at the end of each year.
2. The products can be sold at the prevailing world
price of oil. (Adjustments have been made to allow
for the different grades of fuel from the different
processes, and the calculations are described in
Appendix B.)
3. Total taxes amount to 50% of taxable income.
4. An annual deferred investment of $9.9 MM (except in
the last two years) is added to the operating costs
for replacement of worn-our equipment.
5. The initial investment is depreciated over thirteen
years by the sum-of-years digits method (100%
capitalization assumed).
6. The entire project is 100% equity funded.
7. The operating costs escalate at a real rate of 2%
per year.
Having generated the stream of cashflows to the projects
(one stream for each technology under each scenario), we
calculate the NPV of each stream at discount rates between 0%
-17-
and 20% in increments of 2%.* In order to determine the
sensitivity of profitability to cost overruns, we repeat the
calculations for 20% and 40% cost overruns.
The results of these calculations are presented in Tables
C.1, C.2, and C.3 of appendix C. For the case of no cost over-
run (Table C.1), we see that none of the technolgoies are prof-
itable (i.e., have positive NPV) under scenarios 4 and 5.
Excluding EDS, they are profitable for discount rates less than
8-10% under scenario 2, and less than 16% under scenarios 1 and
3. EDS, the most expensive of the five technologies and the
one for which our cost estimates are more realistic (see
Appendix B) is only profitable under scenarios 1 and 3, and
then only for discount rates less than 4-6%. The cost over-
runs (Tables C.2 and C.3) naturally have the effect of re-
ducing profitability: in the case of a 40% cost overrun
(which is not unheard of in large construction projects
involving untried technology), none of the technologies have
positive NPV for discount rates above 10%, even under extremely
* Although net present value is fairly well accepted asameasure
of profitability, there is some controversy over the discount
rate that should be used in the calculation. Generally
speaking, the discount rate should reflect the riskiness of
the project: the more risky the project, the higher the
discount rate that should be used. Alternatively, it may be
argued that the discount rate should be the firm's weighted
cost of capital. Rather than discuss these issues, here we
have used the range of discount rates mentioned to illustrate
the effect of NPV, and refer the reader to Reference (12) for
discussion of alternative measures of profitability and
choice of discount rates.
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high oil price scenarios (for example, scenario 3). To sum up,
then, the technologies examined in this report (and therefore
other technologies in the same cost range) will only be profit-
able if the price of oil rises very rapidly in the next five
or six years and remains high over the life of the plant.
Thus far in our financial analysis, we have used only
expected values for the cost estimates, and our sensitivity
analysis has been simply to examine the effects of 20% and
40% cost overruns on profitability. We would like, however,
to obtain a measure of the variability of the net present
value of the cashflow streams. More specifically, we would
like to investigate a continuum of cost overruns, each weighted
by the probability of its occurrence. In general, this type of
analysis is performed by first assigning appropriate probability
distributions to the input parameters of the model (appropriate
in the sense that the distribution captures as nearly as
possible values of that parameter). Then, using a computer to
generate values from the probability distribution for each
parameter, the NPV is calculated using those values. This
procedure is repeated a large number of times, each time
drawing values from the same distributions, thus generating
an approximate, discrete, probability distribution for the NPV,
The standard deviation and mean of this distribution will
approximate those of the "true" distribution of the net present
-19-
value. *
In order to perform such simulations, we must represent
the probability distributions of the basic input parameters to
our cashflow model, the investment and operating costs of
each technology. To do this it is necessary to make several
simplifying assumptions, which we summarize as follows:
1. The investment and operating costs are assumed to be
normally distributed.
2. Experience shows that cost estimates given before the
construction of the first commercial plant are nearly
always too low, and that "cost underruns" are rarely
heard of. Therefore it is not reasonable to use the
cost estimates in Table 1 as the means of our
distributions, as that would generate values both
above and below the estimates. Rather, it would
appear more reasonable to view the figures in Table
1 as lower bounds, and to arrange our distributions
so that the bulk of the values generated lie above
these estimates. This is achieved by choosing a
suitable cost overrun as the mean of the distribution
and by taking the difference between this figure and
the corresponding value in Table 1 as being equal to
two standard deviations.**
* For a discussion of risk analysis in capital investment
decisions, see References (13), (14), and (15).
** 95% of the area under a normal distribution lies within two
standard deviations on either side of the mean.
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3. In the case of EDS, Exxon Research and Engineering
Company has estimated and employed a 40% overall
contigency on costs based on their "process
development allowance."* Since we did not include
this in our EDS figures in Table 1, we use a 40%
cost overrun as the mean of the EDS investment and
operating cost distributions.
4. Because of the relatively greater uncertainty in our
cost data (an not necessarily fundamental to the
technology), we take 50% cost overruns for the SRC,
Synthoil and H-Coal cost distributions, and a 60%
cost overrun for the shale oil cost distributions.
5. We assume that the investment and operating costs are
perfectly correlated, as situations involving large
investment but low operating costs (or vice-versa) are
very unlikely to occur. For the purposes of the
simulations, the subtotal for depreciation is taken
as 93% of the total investment, and the first-year
costs are held in the same ratio to the annual
operating costs as found in Table 1.
6. As our main purpose in performing the simulations is
to obtain order-of-magnitude estimates of the means
and standard deviations of the NPV distributions, and
to be able to compare across technologies, we have
not used the range of discount rates employed above,
and instead use the risk-free discount rate of 3%
(use of a risk-adjusted rate would involve double-
counting**).
The results of our simulations are summarized in Table 2,
-21-
* See Reference (5).
** See Reference (15).
and are illustrated graphically in Figures C.1-C.5 in Appendix
C.*
As explained in points 2, 3, and 4 above, we have taken the
means of the distributions of investment and operating costs
as being greater than the estimates in Table 1 (this was to
avoid the large number of "cost underruns" which would have
occurred if we had taken the estimates in Table 1 as the
means). Hence it is not surprising that the mean net present
values in Table 2 are much lower than those calculated previously.
In particular, we see that only under the high oil price scenarios
(scenarios 1 and 3) are the net present values positive, and
then only for SRC, H-Coal and in-situ shale, Synthoil has
positive NPV only under scenario 3, and EDS has negative NPV
under all five scenarios.
The standard deviations of the net present value of each
technology are fairly consistent from scenario to scenario (at
least within the bounds of accuracy of our method). Across
technologies, we find that EDS has the greatest absolute
standard deviation, in-situ shale the next largest, followed
by Synthoil, SRC, and H-Coal. They all have large standard
deviations, ranging from approximately $540 MM to $1100 MM, and
in the few instances where the mean NPV is positive, the
standard deviation is significantly larger than the mean.
* The means and standard deviations were calculated by assuming
that all the points within each NPV range are located at the
center of the range.
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TAB.E 2: Summary of the simulation results
_j~ ~ ~ DISTRIBUTION OF NPV:
ECHNOLOGY SCENARIO MEAN (MM) STANDARD DEVIATION ($MM)
SRC 1 40 627
2 -659 591
3 426 632
4 -1806 541
5 -1880 560
SYNTHOIL 1 -302 583
2 -1062 694
3 20 696
4 -2215 648
5 -2358 596
H-COAL 1 464 - 551
2 -184 488
3 945 496
4 -1279 481
5 -1482 517
EDS 1 -1671 966
2 -2760 709
3 -1224 861
4 -3804 920
5' -4654 1091
IN-SITU 1 56 710
SHALE 2 -772 755
3 394 628
4 -1820 656
5 -1912 665
* The distributions are illustrated in Figures C.1 - C.5 in Appendix C.
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As we stated at the outset of this paper, it is necessary
to obatin some quantitative measure of the economic viability
of synthetic fuels production before government policy regard-
ing their commercialization can be formulated. It does not
matter so much that our cost estimates for the technologies
are subject to uncertainty, nor that we have had to make many
simplifying assumptions in order to arrive at the measures of
profitability. What is important is to recognize where the
major uncertainties lie, and to appreciate that the order-of-
magnitude of the results alone can further our understanding
of the economics of these technologies. It is appropriate at
this point to review some of the assumptions of our model and
the way in which it treats the major sources of uncertainty.
Broadly speaking, the two most important elements of any
model designed to perform this sort of analysis are: (1) the
way in which the parameters entering into the cashflow calcu-
lation interact, their correlation and interdependence; and,
(2) how the uncertainties, both exogenous and endogenous to
the model, are captured in the analysis.
These two elements are clearly closely related: in
designing the model one must identify the parameters necessary
to calculate the cashflows to the project, determine their
interdependence and correlation, and evaluate the uncertainties
surrounding them. To model all the uncertainties would clearly
serve only to obscure the important features of the problem, so
in most cases only the key sources of uncertainty
-24-
are modeled. These are typically the parameters that would be
incorporated in a standard sensitivity analysis, where expected
values are utilized for the other, less uncertain, parameters.
This reflects the essential nature of simulation risk analysis:
it represents a continuum of sensitivity tests, each weighted
by the probability of its occurence.
Of the major sources of uncertainty involved in these
projects, the first is the technological uncertainty regarding
the scaling-up of the process to a commercial size, The
uncertainty we are referring to here is not so much whether
or not the process will work at the commercial scale, but what
modifications in yields and throughputs will be necessary,
and how these will affect both the investment and operating
costs. These uncertainties are resolved very early in the
life of the plant, although in principle:problems can arise
in later years. In addition, the first generation of plants
will experience a "learning curve" in the first few years,
which would have the effect of lowering the operating costs
and investment costs of subsequent plants. In our model we
have assumed that the investment and operating costs are known
with certainty once the plant is built, but have allowed for
technical problems in the first year by allowing for only
half the normal output in that year (see page 12, point 5).
As explained earlier in this section, we modeled the cost
uncertainties by assigning probability distributions to the
-25-
investment and operating costs, and used expected values for the
other parameters entering into the cashflow calculations
(except for the world price of oil, as explained below).
Clearly the assignment of these distributions is a difficult
task, as the vry lack of technical information that causes
the uncertainty over the investment and operating costs also
makes the exact form of their distributions difficult to
specify. An important point to bear in mind when attempting
to estimate these distributions is that often the cost esti-
mates given by the engineers are the modes and not the means
of the distributions, In the context of the decision to
build a commerical plant for a new technology, the mode of
the distribution of investment costs (or the most likely value)
may be considered the best estimate of the investment costs
of the first plant, whereas the mean of the distribution may
be considered as the long-run average, or the average cost if
many such plants are built ( for a symmetric distribution,
these two values are equal). We employed a normal distribution
for investment and operating costs simply because we lacked
specific information regarding whether or not the cost
estimates were the modes or means of the distributions. If we
did know which they were, we could employ a lognormal
distribution for the costs. By arranging the 'zero' of the
lognormal distribution to be our cost estimate from table 1,
we could avoid the problem of 'cost underruns' during our
simulations (see page 20, point 2).
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The difficulties in estimating the variance of the
distributions are even greater: in principle one would have to
ask the engineers such questions as, "what percentage of the
time do you think that the costs will fall below such-and-such
a value?", although in practice the answers are vague and
subject to great uncertainty. For want of more precise infor-
mation, we estimated the standard deviations of the distributions
in the approximate form of a percentage of the original cost
estimates in table 1. Overall, the uncertainties and subjective
evaluations regarding the distributions leave much to be desired,
and since the der ed distributions of NPV depend critically
on the input distri utions, one must take care in interpreting
the NPV distributions.
Another major source of uncertainty regarding the profit-
ability of the synthetic fuels plants is that of the world
price of oil. This is present throughout the life of the
plant, and is quite independent of the technological uncertain-
ties discussed above. This source of uncertainty is much more
difficult to model by simulation, because we not only have all
the problems of estimating the distributions of the oil price
in future years, ]hut must also model the serial correlation
of the prices from year to year. In principle this can be
accomplished by modeling the future path of oil prices as a
continuous time stochastic process with three
-27-
components: a deterministic drift (or expected path), a
diffusion term (or Weiner process) representing the variance
about this drift, and a jump (or Poisson) process. The
drift and diffusion terms combined would have continuous
sample paths, and the jumps would represent discontinuities or
sudden shocks to the system. That the world price of oil
should exhibit such properties is not unreasonable: over the
years there is an expected drift or trend in oil prices with
some variance about it. This would be due to factors whose
effects were gradually absorbed into the price of oil. The
discrete jumps could be due to such shocks as a sudden price
hike by OPEC or the sudden cut off of oil from Iran, although
these two examples have different characteristics. The
revolution in Iran is completely random both in the timing and
the impact of its occurence, and is thus almost impossible to
account for in a simulation model such as ours. The regular
annual meeting of the OPEC cartel may prove easier to model in
that the frequency of the events is known, and what is uncertain
is the magnitude of the jump. This uncertainty in turn can be
considered as varying randomly but continuously up until the
announcement of the new price, though of course the price
change will be a discontinuous jump at that point.
We have not attempted to incorporate such complexities
in our simple model: our treatment of the price uncertainty
involved choosing a range of possible scenarios for the price
-28-
of oil, with the path of prices within any scenario being
completely deterministic. Since our range of scenarios is not
exhaustive, and since it is hard to assign probability
estimates to their occurence, we did not attempt to simulate
over the range of scenarios.
Having discussed some of the major sources of uncertainty
and how they were treated in our model, it is time to ask the
very important question, "how do we interpret the resulting
NPV distributions?". Just looking at the distributions it is
not immediately clear what their variance is telling us about
the riskiness of the project. The units of the standard
deviation of NPV are not as intuitive as, say, the standard
deviation of the cashflow in any particular year. And in any
case, unless one has performed this type of analysis for many
other projects for which one has an intuitive idea of the
riskiness, then there is nothing with which to compare the
variance of the NPV. We have been lead only to the qualitative
result that the technologies are only profitable (in terms of
expected NPV) for the very high price scenarios (Scenarios 1
and 3), and that even then the standard deviation is such that
there is a probability that the NPV will be less than zero
(see table 2).
An examination of the distributions on individual annual
cashflows might provide more information, but only if our
model were extended to include the price uncertainty from year
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to year. Otherwise the distributions would be meaningless
due to the fact that our model is deterministic once the costs
have been drawn from their distributions at startup. The
possible advantages of looking at distributions on each year's
cashflow are that one can observe the pattern of uncertainty
over time in the manner in which the variance of the cashflow
distribution changes from year to year. In addition, any
skewness in the distributions would be revealed, and might
aid us in forecasting the cashflows over the life of the
project. As we have stated above, though, this would require
the abandonment of the price scenarios in favour of some
appropriate stochastic process for the oil price,
-30-
IV. The Demonstration Plant
Thus far in our analysis we have considered only the
commercial plant and the problems of assessing its profit-
ability and riskiness. Although the commercial plant is the
focus of the decision process, many important decisions must
be made prior to the last stage. The uncertainties surrounding
the commercial plant, and the way in which we treat them in
our valuation of such an investment will clearly be significant
for our treatment of the preceding decisions,
The process leading ultimately to investments in new
technologies begins with very basic bench-scale experimentation,
and proceeds through various stages of research and development
until the demonstration stage is reached. This stage essentially
involves scaling up the technology and linking together the
various components of the process. It is generally at or very
near full scale, and most often includes all the major components
of the process.
It is important to understand what demonstration plants,
in principle, can and cannot achieve. The primary focus of a
demonstration plant is the purely technological uncertainty:
for example, building the demonstration plant allows a more
detailed and accurate estimation of yields, throughputs, and
overall costs for the specific process in question. Such a
plant does not, in general, address any institutional barriers
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or political or social issues that may be involved, and only
partially clarifies some of the environmental problems by
allowing a better assessment of the environmental impacts of
full-scale production.
As the demonstration plant is not in and of itself a
cashflow-producing asset, the standard valuation techniques
based on the discounted present value of a cashflow stream
must be modified to take into account the special features of
such an investment.
The fundamental characteristic of research and development
in general, and demonstration plants in particular, is that they
are part of a series of investments whose ultimate payoff
depends on the value of the resulting real (i.e., cashflow-
producing) asset, in this case the commercial plant. In this
sense, the demonstration plant is similar to a call option on
the commercial plant, and one would imagine that some of the
properties of options on corporate securities might carry over
to demonstration plants.
The benefits of a demonstration plant arise from the
reduction in the technological uncertainties surrounding the
commerical plant, particularly the uncertainty in the investment
and operating costs. Other uncertainties, such as that regarding
the world price of oil during the life of the plant, are not in
any way reduced by the demonstration. Thus, the construction
of a demonstration plant may be thought of as sampling from the
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probability distributions on the costs. This would reduce
both the variance of these distributions and that of the
distribution on NPV.
To pursue this line of reasoning further, consider a
highly simplified paradigm of the decision process outlined
above. The assumptions defining our paradigm may be
summarized as follows:
(1) The only uncertainty present once the commercial
plant has been built- is: that of the price of oil.
All other uncertainties are resolved with the
construction of the commerical plant.
(2) The operating costs of the commerical plant are known,
and only the investment costs are uncertain prior
to construction of the commercial plant. Further,
assume that the investment costs, I, are normally
2distributed with mean pI and variance 2
(3) There are no taxes. This assumption insures that
the distribution on the present value of net
revenues from the commercial plant, V, is indepen-
dent of the distribution of the investment costs
(because there are no depreciation tax shields).
(4) To further simplify the decision process, assume
that the commercial plant can only be built at
time t=O, or not at all, and similarly that the
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demonstration plant can only be built one period
before, at t-l.
(5) The cost of building the demonstration plant is D,
and its construction reduces the variance of the
investment costs to zero.
The decision tree depicting this situation is shown in
figure 2. If the demonstration plant is not build at t=-l,
(A+C), the situation is left unchanged, and one can look
forward to expected net benefits of max [E(V)-E(I),O]. If
it is built, however, (A+B), the true costs of building the
commercial plant are revealed. Therefore at B, the decision
rule is: build the commercial plant only if the revealed
investment costs are less than the expected present value of
net revenues from the commercial plant, E(V). Hence, viewed
from A, this will occur with probability
pr [I<E(V)],
and will yield a net benefit of
E(V)-E(III<E(V)),
(remember that we are assuming that V is independent of I).
Again, viewed from A, the probability that the commerical plant
will not be built if a demonstration plant is built is
1-pr[I<E(V)],
and will yield zero benefits. Hence at A, one looks forward
to expected net benefits
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This equation relates the value of the demonstration
plant to the variance on the distribution of investment costs,
the difference between the expected present value of net revenues
and expected investment costs, and the cost of building the
demonstration plant. In order to determine precisely how the
value of the demonstration plant varies with these parameters,
we must examine the derivatives of FD with respect to and
These are:
aF A'12-0
(r AJzW
, and is always positive;
FD _ $ if {
,and is negative when >0 and positive whenA<O;
aFD _ a'2/e 
,and is always positive;
_anD = awy o t
,and is always positive,
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We can use these derivatives and the equation for FD to
arrive at the graphs of FD against a and A (figure 3).
Although we have treated only a very simple case, the
qualitative results that can be drawn can be quite valuable,
and it is reassuring that they are in accordance with our prior
intuition on the subject. For example, it was clear that the
value of the demonstration plant would be an increasing
function of the variance of the investment cost of the
commercial plant, and that if I were known with certainty
(i.e., =0), the value of the demonstration would be -D,
Similarly, as the absolute difference between the expected
benefits from the commercial plant, p , and the expected in-
vestment costs,~I , grown larger and larger, we would again
expect the demonstration to be worth -D (in the limit), since
the probability that the commercial plant will be profitable
(in the case where A -o ), or that the commercial plant will
not be profitable (in the case that A+ +X ), tends to zero, We
would also expect that the demonstration plant would be more
valuable if Ov < I than if the reverse were true. All these
intuitive beliefs are captured in our equation for FD above.
Although we have obtained an expression for the value of
the demonstration plant in a very simple case, it is important
to realize where our model may not be a good approximation to
reality, and where further research could introduce useful
-38-
FIGURE 3: The Value of the Demonstration Plant as a
Function of Certain Parameters (see text)
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refinements.
First, the assumption that the operating costs are known
with certainty can be relaxed, and the construction of a
demonstration plant would now sample from the distributions
of both investment and operating costs, or more precisely,
their joint probability distribution (as we stated in point
5, page , it is likely that the investment and operating
costs will be highly correlated, although not necessarily
perfectly so). Taxes could at the same time be introduced so
that the investment costs would be correlated with the
distribution of V (via the depreciation tax shields).
Another assumption, implicit in our analysis, is that
once the commercial plant is built, it will be operated
throughout its lifetime, regardless of the behavior of the oil
price or the general economy. Clearly, a dramatic drop in
oil prices (with expected low prices in the future) might
cause the operators of the commercial plant to shut down
operations and cut their losses. In effect, this would
eliminate the very low tail of the distribution of V, and
could be incorporated into the analysis by deriving an optimal
stopping rule for the commercial plant operations. By
postulating a stochastic process to drive oil prices, one could
in principle apply a dynamic programming technique in optimizing
the value of continued operations during the life of the plant.
It must be emphasized, however, that this would affect the value
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of the demonstration plant only through its effect on E(V),
the expected value of net revenues from the commercial plant.
The simple model developed here, however, is useful in
that it focuses on what the demonstration plant really
achieves, and how its value depends on some of the uncertainties
surrounding the commercial plant. If the model were expanded
to include some of the refinements mentioned above, it would
clearly become more mathematically complex, and might draw
our attention away from the important features of the problem.
These, we feel, are illustrated in the simple example given
above.
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V. Conclusions
In section I we outlined some of the major areas of risk
and uncertainty facing synthetic fuels producers, and discussed
these at greater length above. These risks and uncertainties
are generally quoted as the main reasons why the government
should provide support for private industry in the commercial-
ization of synthetic fuels. Here we will discuss breifly some
of the main arguments why the government should or should not
do so*.
First, in perfect capital markets, the private sector will
commercialize new technologies if and when they are economically
viable (i.e., when the net present value of the cashflows from
the project, discounted at a rate appropriate to the riskiness
of the cashflows, is positive). If the government steps in and
commercializes these technologies before they are viable, it
is creating a social cost, which is ultimately borne by the
taxpayers.
Second, heavy government funding of specific synthetic
fuels technologies may take funds away from other technologies
that may eventually prove more economical than those pursued
by the government. Again, in efficient markets, the private
sector will be able to evaluate the relevant information and
choose the correct technologies when they make economic sense.
* See reference (16) for a deeper discussion of these issues.
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Finally, the technological problems and risks associated
with synfuels production seem typical of those encountered in
the development of any new and complex technology. Markets for
such risks have functioned adequately in the past, and in the
absence of any special reasons for market failure, should
continue to do so in the future.
One reason why markets may have failed, of course, is that
existing government policy in certain areas, and lack of clear
policy in others has created risks that are beyond the normal
risks mentioned above. For example, although there is a
probability that these projects will be profitable, it is in
just those situations that the government might impose an
excess profits tax, thereby leaving the project facing a
distribution of returns that exhibits great down-side risk
but no up-side potential. Financial markets may not be able
to internalize these uncertainties regarding government
policies or regulations, and therefore the government must
either issue clear directives regarding its intended policy,
or stimulate investment in synthetic fuels by some other
means.
Another possible justification for government support may
be summarized as follows: given that a primary goal of U.S.
national energy policy is to reduce dependence on imported
oil (and assuming for the moment that this is a worthwhile
policy in and of its own right), the return to society from
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investment in domestic sources of liquid fuels may be greater
than that preceived by private investors. Hence, it may
be argued, society (i.e., the government) should bear the
costs of development and commercialization of these new
domestic sources. It is not clear, however, that forcing the
early commercialization of certain synthetic fuels is the
least expensive or most efficient policy for reducing imports.
Our analysis shows that the five technologies studied
in this report (and any others in the same range of costs)
are not economically viable unless world oil prices rise
dramatically in the next five or six years, and then only if
the domestic price of oil is deregulated. We would recommend,
therefore, that rather than provide direct support for
commercialization through price supports, loan guarantees, or
tax credits, the government should work to remove some of the
disincentives to investments in synthetic fuels that it has
created, particularly regarding domestic oil price regulation
and the relevant environmental restrictions.
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VI. APPENDIX
A. The technologies analyzed in this report.
B. Our sources of cost data and a breakdown of the
cost estimates.
C. The results of our financial analysis.
D. Overview of the major environmental issues.
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APPENDIX A: The Technologies analyzed in this paper.
Although our discussion and method of analysis in this
paper is applicable to any of the synthetic fuels technologies,
we have chosen specific technologies on which to perform our
analysis. These include four coal liquefaction technologies
and a modified in-situ oil shale technology.
The four coal technologies were chosen for two reasons:
(1) they are at or near the pilot plant stage, and have
received much attention at the Department of Energy; and,
(2) reasonably complete cost data was available, and the costs
appear to be in the same range as those of other coal lique-
faction and gasification technologies. Hence the financial
analysis will give results that may be considered representative
of the other technologies.
H-COAL*
A mixture of finely ground coal in oil and hydrogen is
passed through an ebullated bed catalytic reactor containing
a fixed, solid catalyst. Pressure and temperature parameters
can be controlled to produce either syncrude ((equivalent to a
no. 2 fuel oil) with low quality naphtha or fuel oil with low
quality naphtha. The H-coal process requires dried coal, but
can accept all common types of coal, with minor impacts on
product quality and output rate. The variation of the process
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*See Reference (4).
examined in this paper uses Wyodak coal. Because this process
yields high nitrogen fuels, further refining is both difficult
and expensive. The process studied in this paper includes the
refining stage, and we have adjusted the operating costs for
the different grades of products from the technologies (see
Appendix B). The reactor system is the only part of the
different technologies that is unique, and because of its
sophisticated design, H-coal's reactor system involves the
greatest technical uncertainty. A 200-600 ton/day pilot plant
is under construction at Cattlesburg, Kentucky.*
EXXON DONOR SOLVENT (EDS) **
A special coal-oil base solvent dissolves the coal and
increases the hydrogen-carbon ratio: the recycled solvent is
then re-hydrogenated continuously during the process. In
this way, direct contact of the coal with a solid catalyst is
avoided. A "flexicoker" stage is included in the Exxon pro-
prietary process and converts the heavy residual products to
higher grades. The EDS process can accept all the usual types
of coal, again with differences in the quality of the products
recoverable and the output rate. The process studied in this
paper uses Illinois coal. The fuel oil derived from this
process is high in nitrogen, has a low gravity, and is not
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*See Reference (10),
**See Reference (4).
compatible with petroleum-derived fuel oil. The operating
costs have been adjusted for the quality of the product ( see
Appendix B). Like H-coal, the process has not been demonstrated
at full scale, but the sub-units involved are fully developed
(technical problems still exist, however). Construction
will soon begin on a 250 ton/day pilot plant in Baytown, Texas.*
SOLVENT REFINED COAL (SRC) **
Apart from the solvent used, the process is similar to the
EDS process. SRC has two modes of operation: solid C SRCI) or
liquid (SRCII) product. In this paper we study only the latter,
referring to it simply as SRC. Again, it can accept all common
types of coal. The process covered in this paper, however, uses
Wyodak coal. The main product of the SRC process is industrial
boiler fuel, and can satisfy current air pollution requirements.
However, if the sulfur removal requirements are made more
stringent, the SRC process may have problems. A 50 ton/day
pilot plant has successfully been operated, and plans are
underway to construct a 6000 ton/day commercialisized module.+
SYNTHOIL ++
The process uses dried, finely ground, coal which is mixed
* See Reference (10).
**See Reference (4).
+ See Reference (10).
++See Reference (7).
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with recycled heavy oil. The mixture is then catalytically
hydrogenated in the presence of hydrogen in the char and coal
gasification unit. The process studied in this paper uses
Western Kentucky coal with a high sulfur content. The main
product is a heavy fuel oil, low in sulfur, suitable primarily
for use as a boiler fuel. The U.S. Bureau of Mines had
developed a 10 ton/day pilot plant.*
Oil from shale rock does not, in principle, require
sophisticated technology: the rock must be crushed and then
heated to very high temperatures ("retorting") before it
gives up its crude oil. Most problems, however, are associated
with the very large scale of mining activities involved in the
process. There are basically two kinds of oil shale technology;
(1) the rock is mined and retorted at the surface; and, (2)
modified in-situ retorting, where only a portion of the over-
burden is mined. The rest is blasted to form an underground
cavern of crushed rock which is then retorted and the resulting
oil is brought to the surface. The in-situ process offers
potential economic and environmental advantages over above-
ground retorting, and is considered the one most likely to be
commercialized in the near future. Different variations of
the in-situ technology are required for different deposits
of shale rock, and no single technology can process all types.
-49-
* See Reference (3).
Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain reasonable cost data
for any particular form of the technology (the data is still
proprietary), and were forced to rely on data from a "conceptual
process model" of the modified in-situ technology. Apart from
the cost data itself, which we discuss in the next section, the
general process studied in this report will serve as a
representative of the various modified in-situ oil shale
technologies.
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APPENDIX B: Our sources of cost data and a breakdown of the
cost estimates..
As we have already discussed in Section II of this paper,
there are many sources of uncertainty in the cost estimates
for synthetic fuel technologies. Most of these uncertainties
are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify, and are often
taken into account by adding on an overall contingency for
delays and other problems during construction and operation,
For most of the technologies, large-scale plants have not been
built, and for the most developed, only small-scale pilot
plants have been operated. Hence all cost estimates are
necessarily projections from engineering data, and their
accuracy depends a great deal on the depth of engineering de-
tail used in preparing the estimates.
Although we have tried to put the costs on a comparable
basis, the sources of our figures are not all the same. The
figures for SRC, Synthoil, and H-coal are from engineering
studies by the U.S. Bureau of Mines.* The estimates are
"assumed to be at a point on the learning curve where there are
relatively few areas of uncertainty. Therefore spaces have
been provided for only the very corrosive or other severe
conditions; also no alternate processing equipment has been
provided".** It would appear, then, that the Bureau of Mines
* See References (6), (7), (8).
**See References (6), (7), (8).
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estimates are optimistic and should be taken as a minimum
almost certain to be exceeded in practice.
The figures for EDS are taken from a report by the Exxon
Research and Engineering Company,* representing the commercial
study phase of the EDS process development. Again, the es-
timates are based on engineering data, but this time the work
was carried out at a later stage of development, using more
up-to-date data and a great deal of engineering detail. The
figures for EDS, therefore, can be considered to be the more
realistic of the coal liquefaction data, and in order of
magnitude are probably representative of other liquefaction
and gasification technologies.
We had great difficulty in obtaining cost data for modified
in-situ oil shale processing, the version considered most likely
to be commercialized in the near future. Occidental Petroleum,
one of the leaders in this technology, has kept its data
proprietary. The only data in an appropriate form was that
persented by the Synfuels Interagency Taskforce in 1975,**
Their report included cost estimates for modified in-situ oil
shale processing based on a conceptual process model. These
figures are not as recent as those for the other technologies
-52-
* See Reference (5).
**See Reference (2),
in this paper, nor are they based on the same degree of process
development or engineering detail. They are therefore considered
the most uncertain of our cost estimates, and experience shows
that they are likely to be on the low side.
Tables B.2 through B.11 present the investment and
operating cost estimates for the five technologies studied in
this paper (these costs are summarized in Table 1 in the text).
Table B.1 shows how we have calculated the adjustment to the
operating costs to correct for the different values of the
products of these technologies. The adjustment is made so as
to put the costs on a comparable basis for our financial
analysis. The assumptions in Section II of the report should
be read in conjunction with this section of the appendix. In
particular, note that the figures in the tables that follow
are in 1976 $, and that these have been escalated at a real
rate of 2% per year to bring them to their values for a 1987
start-up * This is to account for increases in construction,
materials, and labor costs.
* These escalated values are in Table 1 in the text.
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TABLE B.1: Adjustment for the differing grades of products from the processes.
From Platt's Oil Price Handbook and Oilmanack, we find that in
1976 the average price of:
gasoline was $137.13/metric ton = $16.89/bbl
boiler fuel " 66.46 " " = 9.80 "
naphtha " 130.69 " " = 17.87 "
The average price of Middle Eastern crude oil in 1976 was $12.24/bbl.
Assuming that the price differential between these products and crude
oil remains approximately constant over time, we adjust the operating
costs of the processes by:
$4.65/bbl of gas
-$2.44/bbl " boi
$5.63/bbl " nap
The processes produced the
SRC Syn
gasol i ne
boiler fuel
naphtha
(bbl/stream
day)
0
45,978
4,022
50,000
oline produced
ler fuel "
htha
following quantities of:
thoil H-Coal EDS
0 32,500 0
000 0 60,000
0 17,500 0
000 50,000 60,000
In-situ shale
0
50,000
0
50,000
Therefore, we must add to the operating costs:
SRC
Synthoi 1
H-Coal
EDS
In-situ shale
(45,978x330x2.44) + (4,022x330x-5.63) = 29,549
(50,000x330x2.44) = 40,260
(17,500x330x-5.63)+ (32,500x330x-4.65)=-82,385
(60,000x330x2.44) = 48,312
(50,000x330x2.44) = 40,260
Note that this adjustment is made only so that we may compare the
technologies at the world price of oil.
* See Reference (9).
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TABLE B.2: SRC Wyodak Coal.
Total Capital Requirements (1976 $)
$000
Coal preparation :29,284
Coal slurrying and pumping 2,055
Coal liquefaction and filtration 169,345
Dissolver acid gas removal 59,738
Coal liquefaction and product distillation 8,793
Fuel oil hydrogenation 65,658
Naphtha hydrogenation 5,763
Fuel gas sulfur removal 4,804
Gasification 20,791
Acid gas removal 22,592
Shift conversion 17,917
C02 removal 12,042
Methanation 824
Sulfur recovery 2,172
Oxygen plant 28,236
Product storage and slag removal 17,371
Steam and power plant 53,810
Process waste water treatment 3,815
Plant facilities 39,376
Plant utilities 56,438
Total construction 620,826
Initial catalyst requirements 2,239
Total plant cost (insurance and tax bases) 623,065
Interest during construction 93,460
Subtotal for depreciation 716,525
Working capital 57,322
TOTAL INVESTMENT 773,847
(Source: Reference (6) ).
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TABLE B.4: Synthoil - Western Kentucky oal
Total Capital Investment (1976 $)
Coal preparation
Paste preparation
Coal hydrogenation
Coal hydrogenation -
Char de-oiling
H2S removal
H2S and NH3 recovery
Hydrogen production*
Steam & power plant
Plant facilities
Plant utilities
heat exchange
Total construction
Initial catalyst requirements
Total plant cost (insurance & tax bases)
Interest during construction
Subtotal for depreciation
Working capital
TOTAL INVESTMENT
* Includes gasification,
sulfur recovery.
dust removal, shift conversion, oxygen plant,
(Source: Reference (7) ).
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18,070
140,857
66,225
20,136
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15,300
108,744
29,1 74
32,151
46,083
506,912
2,700
509,612
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TABLE B.6: H-Coal - Wyodak coal
Total Capital Investment (1976 $)
$000
Coal preparation 47,964
Hydrogenation 372,672
Refinery gas cleanup 24,604
Oxygen plant 62,977
Hydrogen production 100,998
Hydrogen compression 44,531
Ammonia and H2S removal 2,180
Sulfur recovery 5,087
Oil refining 40,092
Hydrogen plant 14,424
Steam and power plant 58,443
Plant facilities 58,048
Plant utilities 83,202
Total construction 915,223
Initial catalyst requirements 7,674
Total plant cost (insurance & tax bases) 922,897
Interest during construction 138,435
Subtotal for depreciation 1,061,332
Working capital 84,907
TOTAL INVESTMENT 1,146,238
(Source: Reference (8) ).
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TABLE B.7: H-Coal: Annual Operating Costs (1976 $)
$00oo0
Direct cost:
Raw materials & utilities:
Coal (1,625.19 th x 7920 hr/yr x $7.50/ton) 96,536
Water (1056 Mgph x 7920 hr/yr x $0.15/Mgal) 1,255
Catalyst & chemicals 17,369
115,160
Direct labor:
1560 manhour/day ($6/manhour x 365 day/yr) 3,416
Supervision (15% of labor) 513
3,929
Plant maintenance:
1049 men ($15,000/yr) 15,735
Supervision (20% of maintenance labor) 3,147
Materials & contracts 23,603
42,485
Payroll overhead (30% of payroll) 6,843
Operating supplies (20% plant maintenance) 8,497
Total direct cost ............. 176,914
Indirect cost (administration & general overhead)
(40% of labor, maintenance & supplies) 21,964
Fixed cost
Taxes and insurance (2% of plant cost) 16,996
Total operating cost, before credits ............. 215,874
Credits: Ammonia (78.48 tpd x 330 day/yr x $60/ton) 1,554
Sulfur (206.40 tpd x 330 day/yr x $25/ton) 1,703
Coke (78.06 tpd x 330 day/yr x $10/ton) 258
Total operating costs, after credits ............. 212,359
Adjustment to operating costs (see Table B.1) ............. -82,385
TOTAL .............129,974
(Source: Reference (8) ).
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TABLE B.8: EDS - Illinois coal
Plant Investment
($MM)
On sites: liquefaction 246.3
solvent hydrogenation 83.5
flexicoker 163.8
hydrogen recovery & generation 246.3
gas & water treatment 49.7
product recovery 8.5
Total on sites 798.0
Off sites: coal receipt storage & crushing 27.5
ash handling 13.7
building, mobile equipment 23.3
utilities 26.4
waste water treatment 67.6
electric power distribution 34.9
tankage/product loading 26.4
Total off sites 253.7
Total erected cost (TEC) 1051.7
Startup costs (6% TEC) 63.1
Total plant cost (insurance &
tax bases) 1114.8
Interest during construction (@9%) 378.6
Subtotal for depreciation 1493.4
Working capital (8% TEC) 84.1
TOTAL INVESTMENT 1577.5
(Source: Reference (5) ).
-61-
TABLE B.9: EDS - Illinois coal
Annual Operating Costs
coal (24 kT/sd x $20/ton x 330 days/yr)
power
water
catalyst & chemicals
manpower
repair materials & other
LESS: byproduct credit (sulfur & ammonia)
Annual operating costs
Adjustment to operating costs (see Table B.1)
TOTAL
(Source: Reference (5) ).
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($MM)
158.40
39.12
0.45
7.82
42.39
65.14
_(22.20)
291.12
48.31
339.43
TABLE B.10: Modified in-situ shale oil
Plant Investment
($000)
plant facilities 20,769
plant utilities 58,031
equipment capital 258,249
Total construction 337,049
Initial catalyst & startup expense 26,772
Total plant cost (tax & insurance bases) 363,821
Interest during construction 56,030
Subtotal for depreciation 419,851
Working capital 67,208
Total investment 487,059
Cost of shale land* 287,100
TOTAL 774,159
* In a lecture at Boston University, Dr. R.E. Lumpkin of Occidental
Research Corporation quoted the cost of one of Occidental's shale
leases to have been $211 mm (1972 $), which we have included here
in 1976 $.
(Source: Reference (2) ).
-63-
TABLE B.11: Modified in-situ shale oil
Annual Opeiating Costs
($000)
Direct costs:
raw materials & utilities
direct labor
payroll overhead
maintenance
operating supplies
17,514
30,814
12,087
9,055
44,337
Subtotal
Indirect costs:
Fixed costs:
taxes & insurance
royalty
Subtotal
Total operating costs
Adjustment to operating costs (see Table B.1)
TOTAL,
(Source: Reference (2) ).
14,381
2,456
16,837
133,788
40,260
174,048
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113,808
3,143
APPENDIX C: The results of our financial analysis.
In this section of the appendix we present the results of
our financial analysis. Tables C.1, C.2, and C.3 show the net
present values of the technologies under each of the oil price
scenarios for no cost overrun, 20% cost overrun, and 40% cost
overrun, respectively. Figures C.1 - C.5 present the results
of the simulations for each of the five technologies. For a
discussion of the tables and figures, refer to Section III of
the text.
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No cost overrun
ECHNOLOGY DIS- NET 'RESENT VALUE ($MN) UNDER SCENARIO:
COUNT
RATE I 2 3 4 5
( ) , 
SRC 0- 2016 1172 2491 -636 - 765
2 1485 751 1923 -602 -726
4 1084 441 1486 -584 -702
6 776 208 1146 -577 -690
8 536 32 878 -577 -684
10 347 -105 662 -581 -683
12 196 -211 487 -588 -685
14 74 -295 344 -597 -689
16 -27 -363 224 -606 -694
18 -110 -418 124 -616 -699
20 -180 -463 38 -625 -705
SYNTHOIL 0 1563 719 2038 -1090 -1218
2 1140 405 1577 -948 -1072
4 819 176 1221 -849 -968
6 573 5 944 -780 -893
8 382 -123 723 -731 -839
10 231 -221 546 -697 -799
12 111 -296 402 -673 -771
14 13 -356 283 -657 -749
16 -67 -403 184 -646 -734
18 -133 -441 101 -638 -722
20 -188 -471 30 -634 -714
(Continued on next page.)
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TA! LE C.1:
TABLE C.l: No cost overrun (continued fom previous page)
ECHNOLOGY DIS- NET PRESENT VALUE .($IM) UNDER SCENARIO:
COUNT
RATE 1 2 3 4 5
H-COAL 0 2523 1679 2998 -129 -258
2 1829 1095 2266 -258 -382
4 1303 660 1706 -365 -483
6 900 332 1270 -454 -566
8 585 80 926 -529 -636
10 336 -116 651 -592 -694
12 137 -270 428 -647 -744
14 -24 -393 245 -695 -787
16 -157 -493 94 -736 -824
18 -268 -575 -34 - 773 -857
20 -360 -643 -142 -805 -885
EDS 0 437 -576 1006 -2746 -2901
2 83 -798 608 -2422 -2570
4 -190 -962 293 -2192 -2334
6 -404 -1085 41 -2028 -2163
8 -573 -1179 -164 -1910 -2038
10 -710 -1252 -332 -1824 -1942
12 -821 -1 310 -472 -1763 -1879
14 -914 -1356 -590 -1718 -1829
16 -991 -1394 -690 -1686 -1791
18 -1056 -1425 -775 -1662 -1763
20 -1112 -1451 -849 -1646 -1742
SHALE 0 ' 2131 1287 2606 -521 -650
2 1577 843 2015 -510 -633
4 1159 516 1562 -509 -627
6 839 272 1210 -514 -627
8 591 86 932 -523 -630
10 395 -57 710 -534 -636
12 239 -168 530 -547 -643
14 113 -256 382 -558 -650
16 9 -327 260 -570 -658
18 -76 -384 157 -582 -666
20 -148 -431 70 -593 -673
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20% cost overrun
ECHNOLOGY DIS- NET PRESENT VALUE ($MM) UNDER SCENARIO:
COUNT
RATE 1 2 3 4 5
SRC 0 1413 569 1888 -1239 -1368
2 974 241 1412 -1113 -1236
4 641 -2 1044 -1027 -1145
6 385 -183 755 -968 -1081
8 185 -320 526 -929 -1036
10 26 -426 340 -903 -1005
12 -102 -'509 189 -887 -984
14 -206 -575 64 -876 -969
16 -292 -628 -41 -871 -959
18 -363 -671 -129 -868 -952
20 -423 -706 -205 -868 -948
SYNTHOIL ' 0 869 25 1344 -1783 -1912
2 559 -175 997 -1528 -1652
4- 323 -320 726 -1345 -1463
6 142 -426 512 -1212 -1324
8 -1 -506 341 -1114 -1222
10 -114 -566' 201 -1042 -1144
12 -204 -612 87 -989 -1086
14 -278 -647 -9 -949 -1086
16 -339 -675 -89 -919 -1007
18 -390 -698 -157 -896 -980
20 -433 -716 -215 -878 -958
(Continued on next page.)
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TABLE C.2:
TABLE C.2: 20% cost overrun (continued from previous page)
TECHNOLOGY DIS- NET PRESENT VALU ($rM) UNDER SCENARIO:
COUNT
RATE 1 2 3 4 5
H-COAL 0 2021 1177 2496 -63'1 -760
2 1387 653 1824 - 700 -824
4 905 262 1307 -763 -881
6 533 -34 904 -820 -733
8 243 -262 584 -871 -978
10 12 -440 327 -916 -1018
12 -173 -580 118 -957 -1054
14 -324 -693 -54 -994 -1087
16 . -448 -784 -197 -1027 -1115
18 -552 -860 -318 -1057 -1141
20 -639 -922 -421 -1085 -1164
EDS 0 -687 -1700 -117 -3870 -4024
2 -873 -1754 -348 -3378 -3526
4 -1022 -1794 -539 -3024 -3165
6 -1142 -1824 -698 -2766 -2901
8 -1241 -1847 -832 -2577 -2706
10 -1323 -1866 -945 -2438 -2560
12 - 1392 -1881 -1043 -2334 -2450
14 -1451 -1894 -1127 -2255 -2366
16 -1501 -1905 -1200 -2197 -2307
18 -1545 -1914 -1265 -2152 -2252
20 -1583 -1923 -1321 -2118 -2213
SHALE 0 1567 722 2041 -1085 -1215
2 '1100 366 1538 -987 -1111
4 747 104 1150 -921 -1039
6 476 -92 847 -877 -990
8 265 -240 606 -849 -956
10 98 -354 413 -831 -933
12 -36 -443 255 -820 -917
14 -144 -513 126 -815 -907
16 -233 -569 17 -813 -901
18 -307 -615 -74 -813 -897
20 -370 -653 .- 151 -815 -895
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~l . i iiiii 
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40% cost overrun
ECHNOLOGY DIS- NET PRESENT VALUE ($£M) UNDER SCENARIO:
COUNT
RATE 1 2 3 4 5
SRC 0 810 -34 1285 -1842 -1 971
2 464 -270 901 -1623 -1747
4 199 -444 602 -1469 -1587
6 -6 -574 364 -1359 -1472
8 -167 -672 1 74 -1281 -1388
10 -296 -748 19 -1225 -1327
12 -400 -808 -109 -1185 -1282
14 -486 -855 -216 -1156 -1249
16 -556 -893 -306 -1136 -1224
18 -616 -923 -382 -1121 -1205
20 -666 -949 -448 -11 11 -1191
SYNTHOIL 0 176 -669 650 -2477 -2606
2 -21 -755 417 -2108 -2232
4 -172 -815 231 -1840 -1958
6 -290 -858 80 -1643 -1756
8 -383 -888 -42 -1497 -1604
10 -459 -911 -144 -1387 -1489
12 -520 -927 -229 -1304 -1401
14 -570 -939 -300 -1241 -1333
16 -612 -948 -361 -1191 -1279
18 -648 -955 -414 -1153 -1237
20 -678 -961 -460 -1123 -1203
(Continued on next page.)
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TALE C.3:
TABLE C.3: 40% cost overrun (continued from previous page)
ECHNOLOGY DIS- NET PRESENT VALUE ($M ) UNDER SCENARIO:
COUNT
RATE 1 | 2 3 4 5
H-COAL 0 1520 676 1995 -1133 -1261
2 945 211 1382 -1142 -1266
4 506 -137 909 -1162 -1280
6 167 -401 537 -1186 -1299
8 -99 -604 242 -1213 -1320
10 -312 -764 3 -1240 -1342
12 -483 -890 -192 -1267 -1365
14 -623 -992 -353 -1294 -1386
16 -739 -1075 -488 -1318 -1406
18 -836 -1144 -602 -1342 -1425
20 -918 -1201 -700 -1364 -1443
EDS 0 -1811 -2824 -1241 -4994 -5148
2 -1829 -2710 -1304 -4334 -4482
4 -1854 -2625 -1370 -3855 -3997
6 -1881 -2562 -1436 -3505 -3640
8 -1909 -2515 -1499 -3245 -3374
10 -1936 -2479 -1559 -3051 -3173
12 -1963 -2452 -1614 -2904 -3021
14 -1988 -2431 -1665 -2793 -2904
16 -2012 -2415 -1711 -2707 -2813
18' -2034 -2404 -1754 -2641 -2741
20 -2055 -2395 - -1793 -2589 -2685
SHALE 0 1002 157 1476 -1651 -1779
2 623 -111 1061 -1464 -1588
4 335 -308 738 -1333 -1451
6 11 3 -455 483 -1240 -1353
8 -61 -566 280 -1175 -1282
10 -199 -651 116 -1128 -1230
12 -310 -718 -19 -1095 -1192
14 -401 -770 -131 -1071 -1164
16 -476 -812 -225 -1055 -1143
18 -538 -846 -305 -1044 -1128
20 -591 -874 -373 -1036 -1116
- ... .. p i1~ -'m~mmmm_ 4
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Figure C.I -SRC
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Figure C.I - SRC (cont.)
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Figure C.2- Synthoil
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Figure C.2 - Synthoil (cont.)
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Figure C.3 -H- Cool
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Figure C.4 - EDS
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Figure C.4 -EDS cont.)
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Figure C.5 - ItSITU SHALE
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APPENDIX D: Overview of the major environmental issues.*
Each of the technologies within the areas of oil shale
processing, coal liquefaction, and coal gasification, differs
in the exact form and level of its environmental impact. In
general, however, the environmental impacts of concern occur
in three distinct forms: (1) the release of pollutants into
the atmosphere and water sources; (2) disturbance of the
physical environment; and, (3) the allocation and committment
of valuable resources that are non-renewable. The effects of
these impacts are manifest in the ecology, in occupational
health and safety, and in public health (or community exposure).
Furthermore, in rural, non-industrialized, low-population areas,
the socioeconomic effects of the development of such industries
will not be negligible and can have a number of adverse effects.
The major areas of impact may be summarized as follows:
1. air quality: Both Federal and state air quality
standards exist, and the more stringent of the two is applicable,
The concern is mainly over plant emissions during processing
and fugitive dust during mining and transportation. In
addition, there is concern over the impact on air quality of
the eventual use of the synthetic fuels (e.g., impacts of
synthetic boiler fuels when used by industry). One of the
* Although there are numerous sources that deal with the
environmental issues connected with synthetic fuels develop-
ment, the most complete is Reference (3).
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risks faced by a synthetic fuels project is that, for many
pollutants, the permissible increases in pollutant levels are
low relative to the background levels. This, coupled with
the naturally occurring wide variation in the background
levels makes the determination of the impact of the plant
subject to great uncertainty.* Hence, even if the plant is
operating within the restrictions imposed, there is a risk
that it will be held responsible for the increases in the
ambient levels of those pollutants. Furthermore, even in the
absence of a synthetic fuels plant, the existing air quality
standards present problems: the ambient standards on some of
the shale tracts are being violated by naturally occurring
hydrocarbons.** This would clearly make the monitoring and
control of the emissions from an oil shale plant on that tract
subject to further uncertainty.
2. land: A major concern here is the scarring of the
landscape due to the plants, mines, and other peripherals,
and the disposal of spent shale in the case of oil shale.
Equally important is the fact that the use of the land for
these plants can permanently alter land use in that neighbor-
hood, destroying vegetation and driving out or destroying
wildlife. For example, in the case of coal liquefaction or
-83-
* See Reference (11).
** See Reference (11),
gasification facilities in the Appalacian regions, agricultural
and forest lands would not be available for other uses, and
reclamation would not totally restore them to their original
state. Reclamation and revegetation would be particularly
difficult in areas of low precipitation.
3. water: Concern here is both over the availability of
adequate supplies and the pollution of existing sources.
Synthetic fuels production requires large quantities of water
at the sites, and in some regions this would mean a shortage
of water for other uses (e.g., for agriculture). The dis-
charge of pollutants into surface streams and leaching into
underground sources can be dealt with at the planning stage
by designing the plants for "zero discharge", where the spent
water is recycled for use at the plant site. Whether or not
the discharge is quite "zero" during full-scale operation is
not, however, known.
4. occupational health and safety: Although there are
dangers present for the operators of the plants, this should
not be an insurmountable problem, and has been dealt with in
other areas (for example, oil refining).
5. socioeconomic: The socioeconomic impacts are those
that can arise from a sudden influx of population into sparsely
inhabited, non-industrialized areas lacking the infrastructure
necessary to support them (the Appalachian and Eastern Interior
regions, though, would not be as seriously affected because of
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the existing labor pools). With careful planning, however, the
population influx and the attendant problems can be adequately
handled.
Many of the above problems have been encountered, and
satisfactorily dealt with, by other industries (coal mining
and oil refining, for example) and can therefore be solved in
principle. What is often presented as unique to synthetic
fuels is the uncertainty over future air and water quality
standards. This is in addition to the uncertainty regarding
the exact level of the impacts of full-scale production and,
consequently, some companies have indicated that they are un-
willing to proceed until the environmental requirements are
fully clarified. It is essential, therefore, that the govern-
ment issue clear directives in this, and related, areas, thereby
removing some of the uncertainties it has helped to create.
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